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  687 
SMITH, SCALIA, AND ORIGINALISM 
The Honorable Judge Amul R. Thapar 
We’ve come together at this symposium to discuss and explore ideas about 
the future of religious liberty in this country.  I’ve enjoyed the conversations this 
morning and look forward to those in the afternoon sessions too. 
From government compulsion to model ethical rules to college campuses, 
issues of religious liberty abound.  And while we’re focused on the future today, 
I’d like to take a step back into the past.  I believe the only way to understand 
what comes next for religious liberty, is to understand where we’ve been.  When 
we think about the current landscape of religious liberty most discussions begin 
in 1990—with Employment Division v. Smith1 and its surprising author, Justice 
Antonin Scalia. 
There are not many justices in the league of Justice Scalia.  Justice Gorsuch 
rightly called him a “lion” of the legal profession—someone who was “a 
ferocious fighter when at work, with a roar that could echo for miles.”2  Anyone 
who knew Justice Scalia admired him—whether you agreed with him or not.  
And his work both inside and outside the court has left a lasting influence on the 
legal profession and society in general.  Whether you are reading Scalia Speaks 
for fun or referencing Reading Law to help understand a statute, Justice Scalia’s 
presence endures. 
So the question I have always struggled with is how could this lion of the 
profession and self-professed originalist author Smith.  As I will explain shortly, 
Smith held that, under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
sincerely held religious objections do not excuse people from complying with 
generally applicable laws.  The criticism of Smith was swift.  And it came from 
all quarters—the ACLU, the Christian Legal Society, the American Jewish 
Congress, Congress, and even Justice Scalia’s fellow originalists. 
Principled originalists like Professor Michael McConnell believed that 
Smith’s holding contradicted the original meaning of the First Amendment.  
McConnell argued that both the language and history of the First Amendment 
demonstrate that the religion clauses are best read as prohibiting “government 
action that promotes the majority’s favored brand of religion and government 
                                                 
Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.  I am deeply grateful to my law clerks who 
provided very helpful edits and suggestions throughout the process of crafting this speech.  I would 
also like to thank Ed Whelan, Michael McConnell, Phillip Muñoz, Nicole Garnett, and Rick Garnett 
for reviewing and commenting on initial drafts. 
 1. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 2. Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy 
of Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. L. REV. 905, 905 (2016). 
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action that impedes religious practices not favored by the majority.”3  While I 
have not gone back and studied all of the sources Professor McConnell has, his 
thoughts made me wonder: How could an originalist like Justice Scalia not only 
join, but author the Smith opinion.  So I took a deep dive into his speeches and 
opinions. 
In this talk, I will first do my best to explain how Justice Scalia’s decision in 
Smith was driven by his commitments to judicial restraint and rules over 
standards.  But then I will explain why subsequent refinements in Justice 
Scalia’s own originalist thinking—New Originalism—might suggest that 
Professor McConnell’s historical evidence gives McConnell the stronger claim 
about exemptions to generally applicable rules. 
I. 
To put the dilemma in context, I want to start with a New York state-court 
case before Justice Scalia’s time: People v. Philips.4  In 1812, Daniel Philips 
went to his Catholic Priest for confession.5  He told his priest that he had helped 
steal some goods from the victim, and gave the goods to the priest under the 
confidentiality of confession.6  When the priest gave the victim the goods, the 
victim informed the authorities.7  The authorities then subpoenaed the priest to 
identify the thieves before a grand jury.8  The priest asked the court to excuse 
him and said “that it would be [his] duty to prefer instantaneous death or any 
temporal misfortune, rather than disclose the name of the penitent in question.”9  
The prosecutor responded, “[t]he constitution has granted religious ‘profession 
and worship’ to all denominations, ‘without discrimination or preference’: but it 
has not granted exemption from previous legal duties.”10  A New York court 
ruled that the constitution required an exemption for the priest.  The 
government’s interest “did not outweigh the interference with the relationship 
between priests and penitents in the Roman Catholic Church.”11 
People v. Philips frames the issue in very simple terms, but it is an issue that 
has befuddled the courts as long as our country has existed.  What do we do 
when generally applicable laws conflict with religious practices? 
                                                 
 3. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the 
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 690 (1992). 
 4. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1410–12 (1990). 
 5. Id. at 1410. 
 6. Id. at 1410–11. 
 7. Id. at 1411. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1412. 
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And this is the exact dilemma that Justice Scalia and the Court faced in 
Employment Division v. Smith.12  In that case, Oregon’s controlled substance 
laws barred the use of peyote and did not make an exception for “the sacramental 
use.”13  So when Alfred Smith and Galen Black ingested peyote for sacramental 
purposes they were fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation 
organization.14  Thereafter, they sought welfare benefits, but Oregon’s 
Employment Division determined they were ineligible because “they had been 
discharged for work-related ‘misconduct.’”15  On appeal of that denial, Smith 
and Black claimed that Oregon’s failure to provide for a religious exemption 
violated their Free Exercise rights.16  The Oregon courts agreed.17 
The Supreme Court, however, did not.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
held that Native Americans who ingested peyote as part of their religious 
exercise were not entitled to an exemption from Oregon’s drug laws.18  Since 
the law was neutral and generally applicable, the Free Exercise Clause did not 
shield the Native Americans from compliance.19  Justice Scalia explained that 
democracy couldn’t function if religious adherents were able to get exemptions 
from any law that burdened their religious freedom.20 
The five-justice majority noted that even though the Free Exercise Clause 
doesn’t require exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability, religious 
adherents can still seek exemptions from the legislature.21  Justice Scalia 
recognized that leaving religious exemptions to the political process will likely 
place religious minorities at a disadvantage, “but,” Scalia stated, “that . . . [is] 
prefer[able] to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which 
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all 
religious beliefs.”22 
Justice Scalia’s decision drew criticism from many quarters.  Some were upset 
because Justice Scalia chose government over religion.  Others complained that 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion (and, in turn, his jurisprudence) would 
discriminate against minority religions.  And as previously noted, some 
criticized his possible departure from originalism.  I am not here to answer the 
critics, but rather to explain how Justice Scalia reached that decision in light of 
his overall judicial philosophy and his view of our constitutional structure. 
                                                 
 12. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
 13. Id. at 876. 
 14. Id. at 874. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 874–75. 
 17. Id. at 875–76. 
 18. Id. at 890. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 885, 890. 
 21. Id. at 890. 
 22. Id. 
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II. 
So how did Justice Scalia, a man of great faith who thought religion played 
an important role in society, come to author the opinion that established a 
government-friendly standard for review of Free Exercise claims?  To best 
understand Justice Scalia’s religious liberty viewpoint around 1990, we must 
understand how it fits within his overall philosophy and originalism as it was 
then understood.  At its core, Justice Scalia’s philosophy was based on the idea 
that the key to our liberty is the separation of powers.  In his own words, 
[A] bill of rights has value only if the other part of the constitution—
the part that really “constitutes” the organs of government—
establishes a structure that is likely to preserve, against the 
ineradicable human lust for power, the liberties that the bill of rights 
expresses.  If the people value those liberties, the proper constitutional 
structure will likely result in their preservation even in the absence of 
a bill of rights; and where that structure does not exist, the mere 
recitation of the liberties will certainly not preserve them.23 
In more colorful language he went on to say that the bill of rights “. . . represents 
the fruit, and not the roots, of our constitutional tree.”24 
Why does that matter here?  Because there was nothing more important to 
Justice Scalia than keeping the assigned branches from getting tangled.  Justice 
Scalia believed it was important that each of the branches do its assigned role 
and no more.  So, when it came to judges, he believed that they should not be 
engaged in policy-making or even policy-balancing, and that a judge’s personal 
beliefs had no place in deciding cases.  Legislators, however, could consider 
their personal and moral beliefs in passing laws. 
Justice Scalia explained his philosophy on this point in a speech titled Faith 
and Judging.  As he said there, religion and morals have shaped our laws since 
the founding.  He pointed out that “[t]he primary impetus for the drive to abolish 
slavery was a religious one.”25  The same impetus drove Prohibition and drives 
laws against bigamy and nudity to this day.26  Justice Scalia’s real point is that 
there is nothing wrong with legislators making policy through the lens of their 
religiously informed moral judgments.27  And, as Justice Scalia pointed out in 
Smith, legislatures may make exceptions to the laws for religious beliefs.28  
Indeed, Justice Scalia believed that our country had a history of accommodating 
religion as he noted in that speech and others. 
But judging is different.  As Justice Scalia said, 
                                                 
 23. ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH, AND LIFE WELL 
LIVED 163 (Christopher J. Scalia & Edward Whelan eds., 1st ed. 2017). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 150–51. 
 26. Id. at 151. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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Unlike presidents, cabinet secretaries, senators, and representatives, 
federal judges do not (or are not supposed to) make policy, but rather 
are to discern accurately and apply honestly the policies adopted by 
the people’s representatives in the text of statutes—except to the 
extent that those statutes conflict with the text, the underlying 
traditions, or valid Supreme Court interpretation of the United States 
Constitution.29 
In that task, he said, judges must restrain from enacting their own preferences.  
“Just as there is no Catholic way to cook a hamburger,” he said, “so also there 
is no Catholic way to interpret a text, analyze a historical tradition, or discern 
the meaning and legitimacy of prior judicial decisions—except, of course, to do 
those things honestly and perfectly.”30  Justice Scalia made a similar point about 
judicial restraint when he said in an opinion that the question of whether 
churches should get exemptions from generally applicable laws must be decided 
by “the people, through their elected representatives,” not the courts.31 
This is also why Justice Scalia preferred bright-line rules to looser standards.  
Rules are necessary to avoid judicial policymaking, and avoiding judicial 
policymaking is necessary to our constitutional tradition.32  Bright-line rules lead 
to certainty because they don’t provide room for a judge to read his or her policy 
preferences into the law.33  Justice Scalia described balancing tests (a type of 
standard) as asking judges to decide if “a particular line is longer than a 
particular rock is heavy.”34  Of course, that’s an impossible comparison.  And 
when comparing two “incommensurate” interests, it is easy for a judge’s 
personal beliefs and preferences to influence his or her decision-making.  In 
Justice Scalia’s view, standards allowed for policymaking.  Rules did not. 
III. 
So now we come back to Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence to see if his actions 
reflected his words.  They did.  I will summarize briefly three cases and Justice 
Scalia’s view in those cases to proves my point. 
In 1989, practitioners of a strict form of Judaism known as Satmar Hasidim 
bought a parcel of land in Orange County, New York.35  There, they formed a 
village where they built their homes, established private religious schools, and 
                                                 
 29. SCALIA, supra note 23, at 152. 
 30. Id. 
 31. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 32. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176–77 
(1989). 
 33. See id. at 1177 (“[I]n a system in which prior decisions are authoritative, no opinion can 
leave total discretion to later judges.  It is all a matter of degree.”). 
 34. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 35. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690–91 (1994). 
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built their synagogue.36  They lived a life very different from much of modern 
New York, and their village grew to a population of 8,500.37  Yet as they grew, 
a problem arose—their schools could not adequately educate their special needs 
children.38  So the special needs children had to go to public schools instead, but 
this caused them to go through “panic, fear, and trauma” because they had to 
leave their own community and be with people “whose ways were so 
different.”39  Most of the children dropped out of those schools rather than suffer 
the trauma they associated with going to public school outside their small 
community.40  In response, New York passed a law that allowed the village to 
establish their own separate school district including a school for special needs 
children.41 
This law quickly got challenged on the ground that the government was 
participating in establishing religion.  In 1994, a majority of the Supreme Court 
agreed and struck the law down. 
Justice Scalia dissented.  And it is worth reading the beginning of the dissent: 
The Court today finds that the Powers That Be, up in Albany, have 
conspired to effect an establishment of the Satmar Hasidim.  I do not 
know who would be more surprised at this discovery: the Founders of 
our Nation or the Grand Rebbe . . . founder of the Satmar.  The Grand 
Rebbe would be astounded to learn that after escaping brutal 
persecution and coming to America with the modest hope of religious 
toleration for their ascetic form of Judaism, the Satmar had become so 
powerful . . . as to have become an ‘establishment’ of the Empire State.  
And the Founding Fathers would be astonished to find that the 
Establishment Clause—which they designed ‘to insure that no one 
powerful sect or combination of sects could use political or 
governmental power to punish dissenters,’—has been employed to 
prohibit characteristically and admirably American accommodation of 
the religious practices (or more precisely, cultural peculiarities) of a 
tiny minority sect. I, however, am not surprised.  Once this Court has 
abandoned text and history as guides, nothing prevents it from calling 
religious toleration the establishment of religion.42 
Justice Scalia further pointed out that “[w]hen a legislature acts to 
accommodate religion, particularly a minority sect, ‘it follows the best of our 
traditions.’”43  And when the Court strikes down such legislative 
accommodation, it “turn[s] the Establishment Clause into a repealer of our 
                                                 
 36. Id. at 691. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 692. 
 39. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 40. Id. at 693. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 744. 
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Nation’s tradition of religious toleration.”44  So, in Kiryas Joel, Justice Scalia 
sided with the religious minority. 
The second case is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States45—a case that 
predated Justice Scalia’s tenure on the Supreme Court, but about which Justice 
Scalia expressed his views.  Throughout his career, Justice Scalia remained 
consistent in believing that it was the legislature’s, not the court’s, job to create 
exemptions.  In READING LAW, Justice Scalia stated that Holy Trinity, which 
sided with a religious majority, was wrongly decided.  Holy Trinity involved a 
statute that prohibited bringing in immigrants to perform certain contractual 
services.46  The law made exceptions for actors, artists and the like, but none for 
clergymen.47  And when a New York church contracted with an Englishman to 
become its pastor, the United States sued.48  The Supreme Court created an 
exception that was not provided for by the text.49  As Justice Scalia noted, some 
commentators justified that decision because it allowed judges to use their sense 
of “community morality” or allowed judges to make the law “fairer, wiser, and 
more just.”50  At this Justice Scalia scoffed.  And while he did so on textualist 
grounds, the consistency is what is important for our purposes.  Justice Scalia 
did not believe that judges should depart from a clear textual command by 
creating religious exceptions to generally applicable laws, even if those 
exceptions favored his own religion. 
Similarly, while Justice Scalia believed the Constitution neither prohibited nor 
required legislative accommodations for religion, he also did not believe that the 
government could outright discriminate against religion.  The Free Exercise 
Clause, in Justice Scalia’s view, required neutrality toward religion. 
That brings us to the third case: Locke v. Davey.51  In Locke, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote an opinion holding that it was permissible for the State of 
Washington to exclude otherwise-qualified students from receiving a 
scholarship solely because those students wanted to pursue a theology degree.52  
Justice Scalia dissented.  When a state makes a benefit generally available, it 
should be available to all irrespective of their religious belief.53  “[A]nd when 
the State withholds that benefit from some individuals solely on the basis of 
religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had imposed a 
                                                 
 44. Id. at 752. 
 45. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 46. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 11 (1st ed. 2012). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 12 (internal citation omitted). 
 51. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 52. Id. at 715, 725. 
 53. Id. at 726–27. 
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special tax.”54  As Justice Scalia pointed out, the only program of study that was 
singled out for disfavor was religion.55  Indeed, the plaintiff was not asking to 
be treated differently; rather he was asking that he be treated the same as 
everyone else.56  Justice Scalia finished by saying, 
Let there be no doubt: This case is about discrimination against a 
religious minority.  Most citizens of this country identify themselves 
as professing some religious belief, but the State’s policy poses no 
obstacle to practitioners of only a tepid, civic version of faith.  Those 
the statutory exclusion actually affects—those whose belief in their 
religion is so strong that they dedicate their study and their lives to its 
ministry—are a far narrower set.57 
In sum, to his critics, Justice Scalia’s Smith decision ignored the country’s 
vow to protect religion.  But Justice Scalia believed that religion and religious 
minorities were best protected by the legislature.  And his decisions reflected 
this view.  Justice Scalia believed (1) the legislature could not discriminate 
against religion (Locke v. Davey), (2) when the legislature accommodates 
minority religions “it follows the best of our traditions” (Kiryas Joel),58 but (3) 
the courts cannot compel the legislature to make exceptions from generally 
applicable laws (Smith). 
IV. 
Let me conclude by explaining how Justice Scalia and his originalist critics 
might both have a point.  To understand how I could make this statement, one 
must understand how originalism has developed over the last 30 years. 
Modern originalism emerged largely as a reaction to the perceived excesses 
of the Warren Court.  Originalists of that mold, such as Justice Scalia and Judge 
Robert Bork, cared deeply about religious liberty.  But they believed that such 
protections would primarily come from the legislature, not the courts.  These 
first-generation originalists worried most about the Court encroaching on 
democracy’s role.  Where a judge had “no basis other than his own values upon 
which to set aside . . . community judgment,” he had no basis to intervene.59  The 
answer, for these originalists, was judicial restraint, giving the political branches 
the benefit of the doubt. 
Justice Scalia’s strong preference for rules over standards was likewise a 
response to the balancing tests of the prior era, which Justice Scalia perceived 
as mushy, unpredictable, and useful only for empowering judges.  Thus, at the 
                                                 
 54. Id. at 726–27. 
 55. Id. at 727. 
 56. Id.    
 57. Id. at 733. 
 58. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet et. al., 512 U.S. 687, 744 (internal citation omitted). 
 59. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 
10 (1971). 
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time of Smith, Justice Scalia filtered his originalism through the twin lenses of 
democracy and the need for clear rules over vague standards.  To Justice Scalia, 
the “primary commitment” of originalism “was to judicial restraint” and 
“judicial deference to legislative majorities.”60 
So, what has changed?  Self-described New Originalists realized that the 
entire interpretive model could not be built on responding to the Warren Court’s 
encroachments on federalism and the separation of powers.  And Professor 
Michael McConnell, one of Smith’s foremost critics, is not surprisingly one of 
“the most prominent new originalist[s].”61  New Originalists rely heavily on 
historical evidence, linguistic analysis, and significant academic and historical 
scholarship.62  Most importantly, “new originalism does not require judges to 
get out of the way of legislatures.  It requires judges to uphold the original 
Constitution—nothing more, but also nothing less.”63  In short, “[t]he primary 
virtue claimed by the new originalism is one of constitutional fidelity, not of 
judicial restraint or democratic majoritarianism.”64  A limited judicial role and 
democracy are still quite important under New Originalism, but the line dividing 
courts and legislatures must be grounded in the original public meaning of the 
specific text of the Constitution. 
When one thinks about it through this lens, one sees how Justice Scalia could 
write the Smith decision and how principled originalists today could criticize it 
and conclude perhaps that although Scalia’s perspective was defensible then, 
Smith’s holding may not be today.  Smith employed very little history in its 
analysis.  Contrast that with McConnell’s critique where he provides both a 
historical and a linguistic basis for why Smith is wrong.65  While Justice Scalia 
did not initially engage the historical evidence in Smith, he did in his Boerne 
concurrence seven years later.  There he argued that the evidence was 
inconclusive at best.66  He pointed out that even Professor McConnell conceded 
that “constitutionally compelled exemptions [from generally applicable laws 
regulating conduct] were within the contemplation of the framers and ratifiers 
as a possible interpretation of the free exercise clause.”67  Therefore, Justice 
Scalia believed that when the evidence was inconclusive “the people” rather than 
                                                 
 60. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 602 (2004). 
 61. Id. at 608. 
 62. Id. at 608–09; see, e.g., Thomas R. Lee & Steven C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary 
Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 792 (2018); Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning 
of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 850–51 (2003); Josh Blackman & James C. Philips, 
Corpus Linguistics and the Second Amendment, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (August 7, 2018), 
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/corpus-linguistics-and-the-second-amendment/. 
 63. Whittington, supra note 60, at 609. 
 64. Id. 
 65. McConnell, supra note 4, at 1414–15; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism 
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1115–17 (1990). 
 66. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537–44 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. at 537–38 (emphasis omitted). 
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the courts should decide whether exemptions should exist.68  And more recent 
history, in the form of state and federal statutes passed to protect religious 
exercise, has proven that this can occur. 
Ultimately, Justice Scalia was an originalist with a strong democratic bent.  
But Justice Scalia also remained open-minded, and he was willing to revisit his 
past thinking on issues.69  Perhaps better than most, he understood that the Court 
was not “final because [it was] infallible, but . . . infallible only because [it was] 
final.”70  The million-dollar question, however, is would he have revisited Smith.  
On the one hand, when viewed through the lens of New Originalism—as 
Professor McConnell compellingly does—there are many arguments for why 
Smith is wrong.  On the other hand, Justice Scalia firmly believed that the 
interpretation of the Constitution should never rest upon “the changeable 
philosophical predilections of the Justices,” but rather on the “deep foundations 
in the historic practices of our people.”71  And when he believed the Constitution 
was silent on a particular question, he put greater trust in the answer of nine 
Americans randomly chosen from the telephone directory than the nine 
justices.72 
Sadly, we will never know the answer to this question because Justice Scalia 
left us too soon.  Yet we can see, at least, that the Justice who wrote Smith was 
not anti-originalist but rather a certain kind of originalist.  While he led the 
theoretical shift from original intent to original public meaning—a move 
foundational to modern originalism—Justice Scalia was perhaps more willing to 
defer to the democratic processes when he thought the original meaning of a 
constitutional provision did not clearly forbid a democratic enactment. 
In the end, whether you agree with Justice Scalia or not, I believe we can all 
agree on this: Justice Scalia’s great faith in the American people drove his 
philosophy.  He trusted them with policy decisions more than he trusted the 
                                                 
 68. Id. at 544. 
The issue presented by Smith is, quite simply, whether the people, through their elected 
representatives, or rather this Court, shall control the outcome of those concrete cases.  
For example, shall it be the determination of this Court, or rather of the people, whether 
. . . church construction will be exempt from zoning laws?  The historical evidence put 
forward by the dissent does nothing to undermine the conclusion we reached in Smith: It 
shall be the people. 
Id. 
 69. Justice Clarence Thomas, A Tribute to Justice Antonin Scalia, 126 YALE L. J. 1600, 1603–
04 (2017). 
 70. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 71. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  As Justice Scalia once 
said, “our Nation’s protection, that fortress which is our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the 
changeable philosophical predilections of the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations 
in the historic practices of our people.” Id. 
 72. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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unelected judiciary.  And this shone through, even in areas where his friends 
objected.73 
*  *  * 
So, where do we go from here?  For New Originalists, deference to the people 
remains important, but only after one studies all of the sources—historical, 
academic, and linguistic—to try to determine the original meaning of the 
Constitution.  Perhaps Professor McConnell said it best when he said that “[t]he 
job of the judge is to ensure that representative institutions conform to the 
commitments made by the people in the past, and embodied in text, history, 
tradition, and precedent.”74  While judges must be restrained—because they 
should have faith in the people—they must first engage in the hard work to give 
the constitutional clauses meaning.  And for New Originalists this would mean 
not only grappling with Professor McConnell’s thoughtful scholarship, but also 
with the scholarship of Professors like Gerard Bradley, Philip Hamburger, Rick 
Garnett, Bill Kelley, Phillip Muñoz, and others, many of whom disagree with 
McConnell. 
Although judicial modesty remains a critical virtue of judging—one that both 
undergirds our separation of powers and reflects the people’s role in our 
democratic republic—judges’ first obligation is to the Constitution itself.  In 
fulfilling that role, if judges can determine the meaning of a particular clause of 
the Constitution, they must say so and provide the historical record supporting 
their conclusion. 
I hope the conversations that we have begun at this Symposium and the papers 
that result will provide judges more scholarship and insights when cases of 
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